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ABSTRACT China's state-guided economic miracle has revitalized a long-standing and 
unsettled debate about the role of government in transformative economic development. 
In a firm-level study of corporate governance we examine whether direct state 
involvement actually makes a positive contribution to the economic performance of 
newly incorporated firms in China's urban economy. We show that direct intervention 
into the governance of firms is likely to yield negative economic effects at the firm level. 
We infer from our findings that it must be other types of government intervention 
external to the firm that explain the success of China's developmental state in promoting 
rapid economic growth. 
KEYWORDS firm performance, fiscal federalism, market transition, politicized capitalism, 
soft-budget constraint, state-firm relations 
INTRODUCTION 
China's market transition from a poor agrarian state socialist economy to a 
dynamic capitalist engine of global economic growth has riveted attention on the 
role of government in promoting transformative economic development. Frye and 
Shleifer (1997) depict the Chinese state-guided economic reform as the role model 
of a 'helping-hand state'. This 'helping-hand' explanation of China's economic 
miracle has gained broad acceptance in the comparative analysis of economic 
transition. As Stiglitz observed, the contrast between Russia's transition, which was 
designed by Western economists and international economic institutions and that 
of China's self-help state-guided approach could not be greater: 'While in 1990 
China's gross domestic product (GDP) was 60 percent that of Russia, by the end of 
the decade the numbers had been reversed. While Russia saw an unprecedented 
increase in poverty, China saw an unprecedented decrease' (2002, p. 6). According 
to the World Bank (2004), transformative economic growth in China resulted in a 
population of 170 million moving out of absolute poverty, accounting for more 
than 75 percent of poverty reduction in the developing world from 1990 to 2000. 
mm. 
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China's explosive economic growth appears to have self-sustaining momentum. By 
2040, the Economist (16 September 2006, p. 10) predicts China will emerge as the 
largest economy in the world. Not surprisingly, international economic institutions 
now view China as the latest entry in the pantheon of successful developmental 
states, along with South Korea, Taiwan and Japan (Stiglitz, 2002). 
China's policy model clearly resembles core features of the dominant paradigm 
for the development of East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (White and 
Wade, 1988), building on a strong authoritarian national leadership and an elite 
state bureaucracy pursuing developmentally oriented policies, including the direct 
means of governing the market (Wade, 1990). In Japan's post-war economic 
development, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), for 
instance, intervened both at the firm level and at the level of macroeconomic policy 
to facilitate Japan's export-driven growth strategy (Johnson, 1982). However, 
which type of government action actually promoted transformative economic 
growth remains underspecified in the developmental state literature (Evans, 1989; 
Evans et a l , 1985). In this sense, as Wade (1990, p. 26) rightly criticizes, develop-
mental state theory has little to say 'about the nature of policies and their impact 
on industrial performance'. 
Similarly, the causal mechanisms of China's economic success are not yet well 
understood. Is China's economic success due to the government's organizational 
capacity to monitor and intervene in firms' decisions? Walder's (1995) version of 
'local state corporatism', characterized by Peng (2001) as the 'corporate gover-
nance approach', explains the success of China's rural industry as the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on the incentives for lower-level government officials to promote 
economic performance in their jurisdiction. According to this view, when govern-
ment has clear incentives and the ability to monitor firms and enforce their 
interests as owners, government officials can replace the entrepreneur as the 
mechanism driving improvements in firms' economic performance. Or is China's 
success, quite to the contrary, built on: the gradual liberalization of product and 
labour markets; increasing openness to foreign trade; investment in infrastructure 
and institutional reforms such as property reforms; and quasi-privatization? These 
would provide individual actors with sufficient security for planning, investing and 
economic risk taking. 
Building on the long-standing debate on government intervention, we test 
whether government involvement at the firm level has positive effects on the firm's 
performance. In particular, we engage in a micro-level study of state-guided 
economic development in China, investigating whether government officials' 
involvement in monitoring and intervening in corporate decisions actually make a 
positive contribution to the economic performance of firms. We focus on China's 
newly incorporated listed firms which have organizational features and incentive 
structures previously identified as crucial characteristics of China's rural industry. 
As described in Walder's (1995) state-centered approach on rural township-village 
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enterprises (TVEs), listed firms are operating under hard budget constraints and 
state representatives in charge of administering government-owned shares are 
benefiting from greatiy improved monitoring and screening devices compared with 
the management of traditional state-owned enterprises. Similar to TVEs, the 
structure of corporate governance of listed firms enables the government jurisdic-
tion that owns a share in the firm to monitor and intervene actively in the firm. 
Listed firms comprise China's key enterprises, singled out to be the mainstay of 
economic development and emerging capitalism (they comprise the whole spec-
trum of sensitive key sectors of the national economy with firms being involved in 
power generation and distribution, telecommunications and natural resources 
processing). As large-scale, modern corporations, China's listed firms represent the 
classical target of state monitoring activity, the big business groups and conglom-
erates in core industries (as in Japan and South Korea). Briefly, the listed firms are 
a core component of China's industrial landscape and will critically determine 
national competitiveness on global markets and national development prospects. 
For example, firms leading China's bid as a global economic power, such as China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation, are listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
The crucial role of listed firms as a development tool is acknowledged by Article 3 
of the 'Preliminary methods for state asset management of listed firms', which 
emphasizes the need to develop firms in line with industrial policy programmes and 
national investment priorities.tl] Controlling shares in most of the previously wholly 
state-owned firms remain in government ownership. 
Our study seeks to clarify whether or not China's success in state-guided eco-
nomic growth can be attributed to direct government intervention in corporate 
governance. To address this question, we examine the effect of government inter-
vention in the corporate governance of firms listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section gives a brief coverage 
of the debate on government intervention. We will then specify why China's 
state-guided approach to economic development shares the core components of 
the East Asian developmental state. The following empirical part will test whether 
direct government intervention yields positive economic effects at the firm 
level. 
HYPOTHESES 
The Debate on Government Intervention 
In the liberal political economy since Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (Smith, 
1776), the government monitors and enforces the regulatory environment in 
which firms compete for survival and profits, but should not directly be involved 
in a firm's decisions and transactions. Multiple explanations have been advanced 
to account for why state control over economic activity will lead to economic 
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failure. Public choice theory calls particular attention to the self-interested behav-
iour of bureaucrats who seek to maximize their own budgets (Niskanen, 1971) 
and politicians who give priority to securing political support (e.g., votes) in order 
to increase their chances for staying in power (Buchanan et al., 1980). Further, 
the rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups and politicians override 
the idea of a Benthamite welfare state as a neutral arbitrator (Krueger, 1974; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Another vein of the economic literature warns that 
direct involvement of state officials who impose on the firm multiple political 
interests (e.g., job creation) dilutes profit-making motives when social objectives 
collide with the firm's profit goals (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). A weakening 
of profit motives may also result from the government's willingness to share 
entrepreneurial risks with the private economy. Risk sharing by government (via 
state ownership, state guarantees, or the provision of preferential treatments) 
may lead to soft budget constraints, with the well-known negative effects on the 
firm's efficiency (Kornai, 1980). Finally, informational asymmetry and uncer-
tainty critically limits the effectiveness of government coordination of economic 
activity at the firm level. While the existence of market failures that could be 
improved by some kind of sectoral policy is not ruled out, scepticism remains 
about whether or not politicians and bureaucrats are willing and able to mitigate 
those deficiencies without creating even greater market distortions. 
It is impossible, Hayek (1945) argues, for government to have the requisite 
information to plan and coordinate economic activities effectively. Although 
bureaucrats might be suitably chosen to command the best knowledge available, 
this professional expertise will not suffice. This holds whether the government unit 
is a central ministry or local government bureau insofar as no individual govern-
ment official has the requisite knowledge to outperform the market mechanism. 
Successful planning requires unorganized knowledge of the particular circum-
stances of time and place that 'never exists in concentrated or integrated form but 
solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge 
which the separate individuals possess' (1945, p. 519). It is the market, through the 
price system, which serves as the only effective communication mechanism, coor-
dinating relevant facts and promptiy signalling changes in the economic structure 
and the emergence of new profit opportunities. To the extent that societal planning 
distorts the entrepreneurial-competitive discovery process, either on a society-wide 
scale or by means of discretionary intervention, government officials 'are at the 
same time both smothering the market's ability to transcend the basic knowledge 
problem and subjecting themselves helplessly to that very problem' (Kirzner, 1984, 
p. 416). 
In sum, liberal political economy asserts: 
Hypothesis 1: Government involvement in the firm results in negative consequences on the firm's 
performance. 
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In contrast, political sociologists have generally viewed state intervention in eco-
nomic life in a positive light. Weber ([1922] 1978) argued that bureaucracy in its 
rational-legal form was a core institution of modern capitalism because it enabled 
government to intervene to support markets with technical efficiency and rigorous 
calculation. In his debate with economics on the effects of state intervention, Evans 
(1989) criticizes public choice theory for its neo-utilitarian vision of the state as 
driven by self-interested maximizers. Such a one-sided focus on the self-interest 
seeking of politicians cannot explain the state's sustained long-term commitment to 
corporate goals. Evans's own discussion of the developmental state integrates 
Weber's insights on the close positive relationship between bureaucracy and 
markets with central themes of development economics contributed by Gerschen-
kron (1962) and Hirschman (1958). While Evans does not rule out opportunistic 
behaviour and the justified concerns of the public choice school, he points to 
specific structural features of bureaucratic organization that serve to constrain the 
abuse of power and enable beneficial state involvement. In his version of the 
developmental state, as he conceives it, this bureaucracy has sufficient autonomy so 
that bureaucrats can pursue long-term objectives, while being connected enough to 
private capital to be responsive to how changing economic realities affect entre-
preneurial interests (Evans, 1995). This quality of'embedded autonomy' enables 
state actors to inform long-term development goals with up-to-date information 
gained from ongoing connections with key economic actors. Asserting that 'entre-
preneurial activity on the part of the state is a necessary part of economic trans-
formation' (1989, p. 562), Evans calls attention to Japan's MITI to illustrate how a 
highly disciplined elite state bureaucratic organization can motivate and guide firm 
development, with bureaucrats directly involved in the strategic action of firms. He 
refers, for example, to Okimoto's (1989, p. 157) observation that the 'deputy 
director of a MITI bureau may spend the majority of his time with key corporate 
personnel' (Evans 1989, p. 574). 
Walder's (1995) explanation of China's economic miracle highlights the 
anomaly that rapid economic growth was led by public enterprises. This departure 
from the East Asian developmental model points to an even larger role for gov-
ernment in motivating and guiding China's industrial growth. While he - as does 
Evans - admits the general risk of soft budget constraints for public enterprise as 
specified by Kornai (1980), Walder claims that there is no inherent reason that 
public enterprise led by government officials cannot achieve the high levels of 
economic performance of a private enterprise economy. The soft-budget con-
straint problem identified by Kornai in Walder's view is rooted in weaker financial 
incentives for government officials and difficulty in securing firm-level information 
of higher administrative units of government. According to Walder, lower-level 
governments are to a far lesser extent troubled with problems such as weak 
financial incentives, the pursuance of non-financial objectives (as employment 
provision and provision of social welfare and housing) and weak monitoring 
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capacities commonly associated with central ministries. Local government officials 
are therefore well positioned to intervene in a growth-promoting and entrepre-
neurial way in 'virtually all major decisions regarding the hiring and compensation 
of managers, the establishment or closing of firms, the mobilization of investment 
capital, changes in production line and marketing strategies' (Walder, 1995, p. 
271). On the one hand, government officials act as 'market-oriented agents' due to 
stronger financial incentives (as a result of fiscal federalism) and weaker political 
constraints that prevent the closure of firms; on the other hand, local government 
officials have superior information and monitoring capacities due to close proxim-
ity to the rural small and medium-scale industrial firms. While Walder developed 
his state-centered argument to explain the rapid growth of China's TVEs, his 
theoretical logic is not restricted to rural areas. His explanation for why govern-
ment can act in an entrepreneurial style to promote rapid industrial growth 'bears 
upon the incentives for government officials' and the capability for localized access to 
firm-level information and capability for effective monitoring (Walder, 1995, p. 
265). The helping-hand version of the developmental state argument therefore 
suggests the general claim: 
Hypothesis 2: Given appropriate reforms providing both fiscal incentives and appropriate 
monitoring capabilities, firm-level involvement by government officials yields positive effects on the 
firm's performance. 
State Interference in China's Firms 
While developmental state theory does not provide a clear-cut specification of 
the defining institutional features and policies (Wade, 1990, p. 26), China's 
current economic policies resemble common features of the various veins of the 
developmental state literature. Three mutually reinforcing organizational and 
institutional changes define crucial incentives and government capabilities, which 
frame the interactions between government officials and firm-level economic 
actors. 
Strengthening bureaucratic organizational capacity after Mao. Rebui lding and modernizing 
China's bureaucracy has been the government's priority since the start of state-
guided economic reform. The decade-long tumultuous upheaval of Mao's Cultural 
Revolution had demoralized and crippled China's state apparatus. At the outset of 
market-oriented reforms the leaders realized that modernization of the bureau-
cracy was essential to effectively implement their ambitious new policies. As a result 
of the administrative reforms carried out in the 1980s, government regulations and 
procedural guidelines have become more and more precise and transparent (Yao, 
2001). This has increased the predictability of bureaucratic decisions and reduced 
the uncertainty of economic planning. 
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As in other East Asian developmental states, the formulation and implementa-
tion of industrial policy is a central pillar of the state's development strategy. The 
first so-called industrial policy (chanye zhengce) guidelines were implemented in 
1989,[2] when the government perceived that the old planning apparatus was no 
longer appropriate to steer economic - particularly industrial development — 
priorities in China's liberalized market environment. Since then, the government 
has frequentiy revised and reformulated industrial priorities in an effort to single 
out future winners and losers in the ongoing structural transformation of the 
economy. Common instruments such as market entry regulation, taxation and 
loan decisions are part of government's tool-kit to influence the direction of 
structural transformation (Lu, 2000). 
In parallel, administrative reforms in the 1980s introduced strict retirement ages 
for government officials and a one-time buy-out strategy to retire old veterans as a 
means to push out Maoist bureaucrats who were impeding progress in market-
oriented economic reforms. Reformers also sought to build a modernized bureau-
cracy by implementing merit-based entrance exams and promotion schemes (Li, 
1998; Li and Lian, 1999; Nee, 2000). Average education levels increased tremen-
dously with university graduates meanwhile being the majority of new entrants. 
A high turnover in bureaucratic personnel reduces the risk of bureaucratic 
inertia and commitment to the old planning mentality of state socialism (Lipton 
and Sachs, 1990). Moreover, merit-based appraisal of government officials and 
performance-based incentive schemes reinforce incentives in the bureaucracy to 
improve economic development (Chen, 1999; Li and Lian, 1999). Recent empiri-
cal evidence for the period between 1978 and 1995 confirms that the likelihood of 
promotion of provincial leaders actually increases with a province's economic 
performance while the likelihood of termination decreases (Li and Zhou, 2005). 
Fiscal federalism. The theory of state and local finance has long stressed that com-
petition among government jurisdictions has a disciplining effect on government 
action and provision of public goods (Tiebout, 1956). Two main mechanisms 
embedded in jurisdictional competition impose constraints on government eco-
nomic policies and spending (Qian and Roland, 1998). First, under the assumption 
of factor mobility, Weingast's (1995) federalist model shows that competition 
among local governments increases opportunity costs of bail-outs and any activities 
leading to inferior enterprise performance. Government jurisdictions unable to 
provide a hospitable business environment risk failure in competitive bidding for 
investments and resources needed to promote local economic growth. Hence, 
competition between government jurisdictions in a federalist system eventually 
limits discretionary authority, predatory behaviour and rent seeking. Secondly, in 
federalist systems, fiscal decentralization may harden the budget constraints of 
government jurisdictions and provide incentives for the efficient provision of public 
goods. Qian and Roland argue that their model of local federalism explains the 
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emergence of institutionalized competition in which local governments compete to 
build a business environment favourable to private capital. 
In the mid-1980s China's fiscal reform led to a key institutional innovation that 
altered the relationship between levels of government. The policy of fiscal decen-
tralization strengthened the economic incentives of municipal and provincial gov-
ernments to support market-oriented economic reform. First, enterprises were to 
be taxed according to a fixed rate, with the residual left to the enterprise to improve 
incentives for managers of state-owned enterprises. Secondly, the tax revenue 
collected from enterprises by a government jurisdiction was also assigned a fixed 
rate, according to which local government was given residual claim above the 
contracted amount to be turned over to the next higher level of government (Oi, 
1992; Wong, 1992). The more local firms prosper, the faster the economic growth 
of the region, the greater the size of the residual available to the government 
jurisdiction (Walder, 1995). In other words, lower-level governments increase their 
revenue to the extent that they succeed in promoting economic development in 
their jurisdiction. In this sense, fiscal federalism is a central precondition for why 
local level governments are indeed motivated to intervene and manage local firms 
in an entrepreneurial style (Li, 1998; Montinola et al., 1995; Oi, 1992; Walder, 
1995; Wong, 1992). 
Company Law of 1994. In the 1990s, state-crafted institutional change established 
the framework for the conversion of state-owned enterprises into public corpora-
tions. The objective was to transform loss-making state enterprises into profit-
making firms through corporatization and listing on stock exchanges. Listed firms 
gained ready access to investment capital and the legitimacy conferred by the legal 
status of a public corporation. With the Company Law (1994), the government 
sought to bring organizational standards in line with Western-style corporate 
governance (Guthrie, 1999). A vision of corporate governance clearly modelled 
after the modern corporation replaced the old state socialist model of party and 
government managerial control over the firm. As in the West, the board of 
directors and the CEO now play a crucial role in the company's management 
(Wong et al., 2004). 
The implementation of the Company Law has altered both the quality and 
intensity of government intervention in firms, depriving the government of its 
former unchallenged monopoly rights and control over former state-owned enter-
prises. Corporatization and stock exchange listing has reduced the average state 
shareholding in firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange to about one-third of 
firms' total shares. Consequently, the bureaucrats representing the state's equity 
interest on the board of directors are members of a mixed committee representing 
diverse stakeholder interests, although minority shareholders are still underrepre-
sented. In order to professionalize the management of state-owned property, the 
management of state assets was decentralized. Locally, there are basically three 
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types of organization responsible for the management of state assets - business 
groups, state asset operating companies and local finance departments. These 
agencies benefit from a higher level of professional specialization and the improved 
monitoring and information capabilities resulting from their clear authority struc-
tures, responsibilities and task formulations. In addition, there are fewer firms for 
government to oversee than in the past. Formally state asset operation companies 
are charged with the responsibility of preserving and increasing the value of state 
property. They are external to the firm, but they maintain a direct tie to it through 
their participation in corporate governance as members of the board of directors 
representing the government-owned shares. As such, they are entitled to represent 
the government's interests in a firm's strategic decisions, albeit within the frame-
work of an advisory capacity as stipulated by the rules of corporate governance of 
the Company Law (1994). Thus while the firm's top executive - the CEO - has full 
control over its management, government has a voice as a shareholder — the more 
so the larger its ownership share in the firm — and votes on strategic decisions. 
Essentially, corporatization and listing of state firms, coupled with the decentrali-
zation and professionalization of state asset management, resemble core features of 
rural industry management, where public assets were professionally managed and 
administered by local government bureaus in charge of industry development (Oi, 
1992; Walder, 1995). 
Through these post-Mao structural reforms, the Chinese state has evolved into 
a developmental state similar in its core features to its East Asian counterparts in 
Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. However, it differs from these states insofar 
as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) retains coordination rights alongside the 
government bureaucracy. For this reason, it is imperative in an analysis of state 
activities to examine the effects of the intervention of both government bureaucrats 
and party politicians on firms' performance. 
In addition to the classical bureaucratic channel of intervention - as common in 
the East Asian developmental states - local party committees provide a second 
channel of state involvement in China. Party committees are in essence networks 
of political actors internal to the firm that the state can draw on to support its policy 
initiatives and to provide timely and detailed information about personnel and 
other matters. Their formal position within the firm is guaranteed by Article 17 of 
the Company Law, which specifies 'the activities of the local branch units of the 
CCP in a company shall be carried out in accordance with the Constitution of the 
CCP.' This Constitution particularly delegates the implementation of higher party 
decisions to local party committees and grants them the right to 'supervise party 
cadres and any other personnel'. This provision (Article 31) formally confers on the 
local party committee the right to control personnel decisions in state-owned firms 
(Bian et al., 2001). In reality, party members usually succeed in remaining involved 
in almost all domains of corporate decision-making; they generally exercise a 
stronger influence in the firm than government bureaus. 
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Figure 1. Corporate governance of China's listed firms (according to Company Law) 
Source: Nee and Opper 2007. 
The incentives of local party committees, however, may differ significantly 
from the local government jurisdictional unit with shareholding interest in the 
firm. The party committee neither has residual claims nor direct benefits from 
local tax revenues. Party members, moreover, are insufficiendy insulated from 
patron-client ties and may easily be 'captured' by interest groups or be tempted 
to maximize their own self-interests. In sum, the party committee presides over 
a political network in the firm that can be used to mobilize informal opposition 
to reform policies that threaten vested interests in the firm (Nee, 2005). Figure 1 
sketches the internal structure and persisting links between the 'three old com-
mittees' [lao son hui, i.e. the party committee, trade union and workers congress] 
and new decision-making bodies [board of directors, manager and board of 
supervisors]. 
METHOD 
We use data on the corporate governance of firms listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, the commercialized and privatized former large-scale state-owned 
enterprises that comprise the core of China's urban industrial economy. The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange distributed questionnaires to each of the 483 listed firms. 
Of these, 257 firms returned the questionnaires (response rate: 53.54 percent). To 
ensure data quality, we compared the survey data on basic firm characteristics, 
including listing age and industries, with those provided by annual firm reports. Of 
the 257 returned questionnaires, we excluded one because it contained inconsistent 
data. In line with our aim to provide an encompassing measure of direct state 
intervention at the firm level, we decided to limit our sample to firms providing 
complete survey data, reducing the total number to 72.[3] We then excluded six 
firms newly listed in 1999 which did not have lag performance data. Our final 
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sample therefore consisted of 66 firms, which still represents 14 percent of all the 
firms listed by the A-share market on the SSE. 
At the end of 1999, 59.45 percent of the firms listed by the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange belonged to the manufacturing industries, 17.20 percent were conglom-
erates and 11.67 percent belonged to the wholesale and retail industries (see 
Appendix I). The top three industries account for 79.61 percent of all the listed 
firms. Within our sample, 59.09 percent of firms belong to the manufacturing 
industry, 24.24 percent are conglomerates and 9.09 percent belong to the whole-
sale and retail industries. Overall, our sample appears to comprise an acceptable 
representation of the overall industrial structure of the firms listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, without a critical response bias, although characterized by an 
overrepresentation of conglomerates, i.e. large business groups, which indeed play 
a crucial role in China's developmental strategy (Keister, 1998). Furthermore, the 
financial leverage (debt asset ratio), firm size (log of sales), ownership structure 
(percentage of state shares) and return on assets of our sample firms do not show 
any serious deviation from the mean values of the total population of listed firms at 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (Appendix II). Only the profitability measure 
Return on Equity shows an upward bias, with 0.9 compared with the total popu-
lation with a mean value of 0.6. A comparison of the respective standard deviation 
of both measures suggests that our sample is characterized by a smaller proportion 
of outliers in terms of performance measured by return on equity. Since political 
intervention is assumed to be closely tied to industrial priorities, firm size, profit-
ability and financial leverage, there is strong reason to suppose that our sample 
does not suffer from a non-response bias in terms of political interventions at the 
firm level. 
The questionnaire used by the Shanghai Stock Exchange's survey of listed firms 
asks respondents (secretaries to chairmen of the board of directors)[4] to rate the 
level of decision-making power (at end-1999) of shareholders (through sharehold-
ers' meetings), boards of directors, managers and state actors such as local party 
committees and the responsible bureaus of government administration in 63 dif-
ferent types of firm decisions, including decisions on finance and investment, 
appointment and dismissal of key personnel, performance appraisal, organiza-
tional change, strategic planning and external relationships. Responses are based 
on the following scale: 1 (no involvement), 2 (have some influence), 3 (have signifi-
cant influence), 4 (have decisive influence) and 5 (complete control).[5] The survey 
includes 74 questions covering almost every aspect of firms' corporate governance. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the respondents could have perceived the specific 
linkage between state intervention and firm performance. Appendix III summa-
rizes the mean values of decision involvement by these various groups.[6] 
In general, the survey confirms that the distribution of decision-making power 
among boards of directors, managers and shareholders' meetings within China's 
listed firms actually resembles the corresponding distribution among Western-style 
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firms. Across the 63 decision areas (last row of Appendix III), the board of directors 
is most heavily involved in decision-making (mean = 3.61), followed by managers 
(mean = 3.02), followed by shareholders (mean = 2.66). Nonetheless, party com-
mittees (mean 1.65) and government bureaus (mean 1.25) remain directly involved 
in the decision-making, although state control is significandy weakened since the 
pre-reform era. 
Measures 
State involvement. We use data on party and government involvement over 63 
corporate decisions to construct four measures of state intervention. For each firm, 
we construct an index of overall party (PIA) and government intervention (GIA) by 
averaging the level of involvement of the local party committee and the responsible 
government bureaus, respectively, in all decisions. 
n n 
P I A ^ 2 ^ - GIA, = ^ ^ (1,2) 
n n 
S,j is the level of intervention of state actors of firm i in decision j , in all 63 
decisions (n = 63). Nearly all major firm decisions are included, providing us with 
a comprehensive measure of state intervention.[7] 
Our average measure, however, may conflate varying economic effects of dif-
ferent state interventions in the firm. Thus, to additionally investigate specific 
domains of such interventions, we grouped corporate decisions into three broad 
clusters - personnel, financial and strategic - all affecting mechanisms of corporate 
governance: the market for managers, the financial market and the product 
markets, respectively. These domains are also consistent with those areas of gov-
ernment intervention described for China's township and village enterprises (Che 
and Qian, 1998; Oi, 1992; Walder, 1995). 
Interventions in personnel decisions establish close networks between state and 
economic actors that allow other timely and direct interventions, whenever state 
involvement is deemed necessary, in order to realize industrial policy objectives or 
other types of development strategies. Our dataset confirms that China's local party 
committees actually exert the most control in personnel decisions, especially: (i) the 
selection of functional department managers; (ii) the selection of business depart-
ment managers; (iii) the selection of branch managers; (iv) the selection of subsidiary 
managers; and (v) the selection and dismissal of vice-CEOs (see column 6 of 
Appendix III). In essence, party involvement concentrates on human capital issues, 
which have been a central focus of the nomenklatura system for decades of socialist 
planning (Shirk, 1992, p. 61). The fact that local party units tend to have a high level 
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of involvement in decisions assigned de jure to the enterprise manager suggests that 
they may use the manager's office as their venue for interventionist activities. 
Personnel dependencies reinforce informal network ties with decision-makers 
within the firm, which can then easily be activated for further state intervention. 
Similarly, intervention in financial decisions can be used to manipulate resource 
allocation in line with the state's industrial policy priorities and development 
objectives. Studies of the other Asian developmental states suggest that state inter-
ventions were particularly common in financial decisions, including those regard-
ing loans, mergers and acquisitions, the issuing of new shares and so on (Kang, 
2002; Whidey, 1999). For China it is well documented that local governments were 
particularly active in providing financial resources and pooling resources to 
promote the development of China's TVEs (Che and Qian, 1998). Similarly, our 
dataset confirms that with an overall mean of 1.41 (see column 7 of Appendix III) 
government officials actually exert more influence on financial decisions than on 
any other area of firm governance. Four out of the top five decisions (column 8) are 
related to financial issues, including (rank 1) decisions on being merged, (rank 3) 
merging with other firms, (rank 4) changes in shareholding structure and (rank 5) 
decisions on share placements and new issues. 
Finally, a firm's strategic decisions, such as the entry into new markets and 
industries or the creation or abolition of new departments, branches and subsid-
iaries, critically affect market development and may therefore be closely screened 
by any state seeking to promote structural change. Although neither party nor 
bureaucracy has a particularly strong influence on strategic decisions, the party's 
mean value of involvement (1.77, column 5) is still above the overall average of 1.15 
(last row). In contrast, government influence in strategic decisions is 1.24, about the 
same as the mean value of all 63 decisions (1.25, last row). 
To investigate the performance effects of state intervention in these policy 
domains, we construct three measures to capture the level of state intervention in 
personnel decisions (Pip and GIp), averaging 20 decision-types overall; in financial 
decisions (PIF and GIF), averaging 18 decision-types; and in strategic decisions (Pis 
and GIs), averaging nine decision-types, respectively (see Appendix I). 
n 
Pipi^2^ PI, 
n 
n 
GIPl = ^ ^ Gl 
n 
Economic performance. We evaluate the effects of state interventions through two 
indicators of a firm's profitability. Return on Asset (ROA) measures a company's 
net profit divided by its total assets in luding foreign capital and Return on Equity 
Z* I* 
_ j= PIS = J=L (3,4,5) 
I* X* 
G/,,= i=i (6,7,8) 
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(ROE) measures how much profit a company earned in comparison with the total 
amount of shareholder equity found on the balance sheet. Briefly, both measures 
indicate how well the company's management has performed with the total assets 
and with the resources provided by stockholders, respectively. Sceptics may have 
reservations about these measures owing to China's still-immature accounting 
standards. However, empirical work suggests that China has devoted serious efforts 
to making national accounting standards consistent with international standards 
(L ine ta l , 2001).[8] 
Control variables. We introduce the following control variables to isolate the perfor-
mance effects of state intervention as exerted by party and government. 
Lag performance. A high level of state intervention may affect firm performance and 
conversely firm performance may affect the level of state intervention. To partially 
deal with this reverse-causality problem, we include lag performance variables (PL) 
as control variables. This allows us to capture potential interactions between state 
intervention and performance in the previous year. Furthermore, our inclusion of 
lag performance as control variables captures the tendency of respondents to blame 
state actors for a firm's poor performance in the previous year, thus partially 
alleviating the problem of blame shifting. 
Industry. The firms in our sample belong to various industries and therefore enjoy 
different profit-making opportunities. They may also be associated with different 
levels of state intervention because some industries are regarded as politically more 
important than others. We included industrial dummies (INDUSTRY;) for energy, 
transportation, wholesale and retail, real estate, social services and manufacturing, 
with conglomerate as the reference group. 
Firm size. Large firms may benefit from economies of scale and may have better 
access to financial resources, which could improve their performance (Fama and 
French, 1995). They may be associated with a higher level of state intervention 
because they can deliver more benefits to politicians and bureaucrats (Lioukas 
et al., 1993). To capture the possible confounding effect of firm size, we control the 
natural logarithm of a firm's sales (SALES). 
Capital structure. Qi et al. (2000) and Xu and Wang (1999) both find that financial 
leverage in China's listed firms is related to firm performance. In contrast, finan-
cial leverage may be related to state intervention because state actors still provide 
an important network for obtaining bank loans in China (McGregor, 2001). We 
therefore introduce the debt to asset ratio (DAR) as a control variable. 
State ownership. The proportion of state ownership affects the state's chances for 
direct interference and is positively correlated to the intensity and quality of state 
intervention exerted by the local state asset operating companies that manage public 
shares. We use the percentage of state shares (PSTATE) as a control variable. 
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Administrative levels. Following Walder (1995), the administrative level of a firm's 
responsible government superiors (AS) may affect firm performance due to differ-
ing budget constraints and competitive pressure. At the same time, the quality and 
intensity of state intervention may differ due to differing access to local information, 
monitoring capabilities and political priorities. In order to capture possible effects 
stemming from decentralized administration and the proximity between firm and 
administrator, we include three dummy variables indicating the existence of a 
central or provincial government, city or county government and other authorities 
as administrative superiors. 
Decision-making power of shareholders, boards of directors and managers. A high level of 
shareholder, manager and board of directors (BoD) involvement in firm decision-
making suggests the existence of active corporate monitoring and governance, 
which could in turn reduce agency problems and lead to improved firm perfor-
mance. At the same time it implies a lower relative level of state intervention. We 
therefore construct a set of three indices to measure the corporate governance 
involvement of shareholders (SI), board of directors (BI) and managers (MI) in 
decision-making. These indices are constructed in the same manner as the PI and 
GI index. 
Analyses 
Our model seeks to measure the overall performance effect of party and govern-
ment intervention. Each is estimated separately because of a risk of multicollinear-
ity. We construct the following regression model, where P denotes the performance 
measure of ROA and ROE and PIK and GIK denote the four measures of decision-
making power of party committees and government administration (namely PIA, 
PIP, PIF and PIS and GIA, GIPj GIF and GIS): 
Party Involvement 
12 
P = a + £ XKi INDUSTRT, + pnSALES + pK2DAR + pK3PSTA TE + pKAASi 
+ fi^PL + pK6MI + pK1BI + pK8SI + pK9PIK + e ( 9 ) 
Government Involvement 
12 
P = a + ^ XK, INDUSTRT, + pKlSALES + pK2DAR + pK3PSTA TE + pKiAS, 
+ pKbPL + pK6MI + pK1BI + pK8SI + pK9GIK + e ( 1 0 ) 
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RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation and Pearson correlation) are in 
Table l.[9] 
Table 2 presents the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates on the overall per-
formance implications of government and party involvement. For the government 
these estimates are insignificant, though the estimated coefficients have negative 
signs. In contrast, the slope coefficient on party involvement (PIA) is actually 
negative and significant for both estimations on ROA and ROE. These results, 
consistent with those of Wong et al. (2004) and Chang and Wong (2004) , suggest 
negative performance effects of party intervention in decision-making processes at 
the firm level. 
With regard to the control variables, it seems worth mentioning that none of the 
new formal organs of corporate governance established with China's new 
Company Law seems to have a decisively positive influence on company perfor-
mance. Particularly the negative contribution of a BoD is remarkable. Ongoing 
efforts of Chinese authorities to improve internal corporate governance mecha-
nisms therefore seem to be much in line with the current realities in its listed 
firms. 
We performed OLS estimates on the economic impact of state intervention in 
the domains of personnel, financial and strategic firm decisions. As to personnel 
decisions, estimates on performance implications of government interventions 
yield negative and significant coefficients, suggesting a detrimental impact. For 
party involvement, our estimates suggest that interference is not detrimental to firm 
performance (Table 3a). Although the estimated slope coefficient has a negative 
sign, the effect of party intervention on firm performance remains insignificant at 
conventional levels. This finding is consistent with the widespread assumption in 
the literature that party committees have a comparative advantage in personnel 
matters (in comparison with other fields of intervention) due to the CCP's effective 
vertical command structure and long tradition of supervisory activities within the 
nomenclature system. Qian (1995) suggests that party control may limit excessive 
managerial discretion and abuse of insider control, when effective corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms are not yet in place. However, our estimates do not indicate 
any positive performance effects. 
Our estimates on the economic effect of government interventions into financial 
decisions deserve specific attention, as such interventionism undoubtedly serves as 
a central instrument to promote and steer specific corporations in China as in other 
East Asian economies (Table 3b). The high degree of regulation of China's finan-
cial and capital market actually provides convenient chances for state bureaucrats 
to remain involved and to manipulate financial decision-making. First, the stock 
market is a pseudo-market due to over-regulation and heavy state intervention. 
Market entry and market exit are seriously politicized as both procedures are 
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Table 2. Overall effect of state involvement on firm's economic performance 
Independent variables 
(Constant) 
Control Variables 
Industry dummy 
Debt to asset ratio (DAR) 
Logarithm of sales (SALES) 
Lag performance 
Decision-making power of 
Board of directors (BI) 
Decision-making power of 
shareholders (SI) 
Decision-making power of 
managers (MI) 
Shareholding 
Percentage of state shares 
(PSTATE) 
Administrative level 
Central and provincial 
City and county 
Other authority 
Effect of state involvement 
Government intervention (GI) 
Party Intervention (PI) 
Adj R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
ROA 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
NO 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.63*** 
(0.11) 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.38 
0.03 
64 
ROE 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
NO 
0.09 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.57*** 
(0.12) 
-0.06 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.26 
0.08 
64 
ROA 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
NO 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.59*** 
(0.10) 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.42 
0.03 
66 
ROE 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
-0.12 
(0.20) 
NO 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.55*** 
(0.12) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.26 
0.08 
66 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
regulated by complex and opaque approval procedures, which usually involve 
political bargaining processes of the responsible government bureaus (OECD, 
2002). Similarly, new share issuance depends on government approval. Casual 
observation confirms that firms without reliable political networks have little 
chance of being listed on one of China's stock exchanges. Indeed only a small 
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Independent variables ROA 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Table 3a. Involvement in personne l dec i s ions 
(Constant) 
Control Var iables 
Industry dummy 
Debt to asset ratio (DAR) 
Logarithm of sales (SALES) 
Lag performance 
Decision-making power of board 
of directors (BI) 
Decision-making power of 
shareholders (SI) 
Decision-making power of 
managers (MI) 
Percentage of state shares 
(PSTATE) 
Administrat ive level 
Central and provincial 
City and county 
Other authority 
0.05 
(0.09) 
N O 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.65*** 
(0.11) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
ROE 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
0.09 
(0.20) 
N O 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.60*** 
(0.12) 
-0 .04 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
ROA 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
N O 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.64*** 
(0.11) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
ROE 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
-0.11 
(0.20) 
NO 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.60*** 
(0.12) 
-0 .03 
(0.02) 
-0 .00 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0 .04 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
Effect o f state involvement 
Government intervention (GI) -0 .03* 
(0.02) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
Party intervention (PI) 
Adj R Square 
Standard error 
Observations 
Table 3b. Involvement in 
(Constant) 
Control variables 
Industry dummy 
Debt to asset ratio (DAR) 
0.39 
0.03 
64 
financial dec i s ions 
-0 .04 
(0.09) 
NO 
-0 .03 
(0.03) 
0.30 
0.07 
64 
-0.11 
(0.20) 
N O 
0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.38 
0.03 
66 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
NO 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.25 
0.08 
66 
-0.29 
(0.19) 
NO 
0.05 
(0.06) 
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Table 3. (cont.) 
Independent variables 
Logarithm of sales (SALES) 
Lag performance 
Decision-making power of board 
of directors (BI) 
Decision-making power of 
shareholders (SI) 
Decision-making power of 
managers (MI) 
Percentage of state shares 
(PSTATE) 
Administrat ive level 
Central and provincial 
City and county 
Other authority 
Effect o f state invo lvement 
Government intervention (GI) 
Party intervention (PI) 
Adj R Square 
Standard error 
Observations 
V . N e e e t 
ROA 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.61*** 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0 .00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.35 
0.04 
64 
Table 3c. Involvement in strategic dec i s ions 
(Constant) 
Control var iables 
Industry dummy 
Debt to asset ratio (DAR) 
Logarithm of sales (SALES) 
Lag performance 
Decision-making power of board 
of directors (BI) 
Decision-making power of 
shareholders (SI) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
N O 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Q g4##* 
(0.10) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
al. 
ROE 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.55*** 
(0.12) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0 .00 
(0.01) 
-0 .05 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0 .04 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.22 
0.08 
64 
0.02 
(0.19) 
N O 
0.09 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.59*** 
(0.11) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
ROA 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
0.01* 
(0.00) 
0.57*** 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.40 
0.03 
66 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
N O 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.64*** 
(0.10) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
ROE 
Coeff 
(SE) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.52*** 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.0-1 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.26 
0.08 
66 
-0.12 
(0.20) 
N O 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.58*** 
(0.12) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
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Table 3. (cont.) 
Independent variables 
Decision-making power of 
managers (MI) 
Percentage of state shares 
(PSTATE) 
Administrative level 
Central and provincial 
City and county 
Other authority 
Effect of state involvement 
Government intervention (GI) 
Party intervention (PI) 
Adj R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
ROA 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.40 
0.03 
64 
ROE 
Coeff 
(SE) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.07*** 
(0.03) 
0.34 
0.07 
64 
ROA 
Coeff 
(SE) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.39 
0.03 
66 
ROE 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.27 
0.07 
66 
Motes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
minority of private firms are currently listed. Furthermore, the market for mergers 
and acquisitions is regulated with unclear criteria, offering a wide leeway for 
government involvement. Finally, the state banking system has only recently 
undergone very limited property right diversification and is still under intermittent 
pressure from the government to expand loans to rescue ailing state-owned firms 
(Woo, 2002). Though 'China's Law for Commercial Banking' stipulates that credit 
policy should be independent from state involvement (Leung and Mok, 2000; Zhu, 
1999), a large number of loan decisions are influenced by political involvement, 
which banks can hardly escape, given the close networks between government, 
banks and enterprises (Park and Sehrt, 2001). 
In spite of the strong predisposition of financial and capital markets to invite 
government intervention, our estimates do not suggest that government involve-
ment in capital allocation promotes corporate performance. Consistent with our 
estimates on overall government intervention, state involvement is not associated 
with a significant positive effect on firm performance. Instead we estimate negative 
(though statistically insignificant) slope coefficients for both ROE and ROA. Our 
estimates once again suggest the absence of a 'helping hand' effect of government 
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involvement in firms' financial decision-making. As for party intervention in finan-
cial decisions, our estimates yield a significant and negative effect for both perfor-
mance measures. 
For interventions in strategic decisions, our estimates are again mixed 
(Table 3c). We yield significant and negative performance effects for government 
involvement for both ROA and ROE, while the slope coefficients for party inter-
ference are negative but not significant at conventional levels (20 percent and 15 
percent, respectively). 
DISCUSSION 
Summarizing our results, we find support for the political economy perspective 
emphasizing the state's inability to provide positive economic effects through direct 
intervention at the firm level (supporting HI). Negative significant effects are 
reported in the case of government involvement on personnel decisions as well as 
involvement in strategic firm decisions. Party intervention yields significant nega-
tive effects in the case of financial decisions as well as in an overall perspective 
averaging all firm decisions. 
To the contrary, our tests do not indicate any positive economic effects of state 
involvement at firm level. In spite of an encompassing decentralization of state-
share administration accompanied by strengthened fiscal incentives and improved 
monitoring and information capabilities of local government officials, we cannot 
identify any positive economic effects resulting from government intervention into 
firm decisions. Hypothesis 2 is clearly rejected. We therefore find no support for the 
state-centered approach, which predicts that a decentralization of public asset 
management reduces the risk of negative economic effects. Not only the lack of 
positive effects for state intervention is worth noting, but we also cannot establish 
a linkage between company performance and the level of administrative respon-
sibility for the firm. Our findings are in line with Peng (2001), who also failed to 
produce evidence for the superior firm productivity of TVEs at the bottom levels 
of the hierarchy of government jurisdictions in China. Our confirmation of Peng's 
results for rural industry further undermines the general validity of the claim that 
as financial incentives increase in intensity and monitoring capacity improves, 
government can enhance the economic performance of firms through direct 
involvement in corporate governance (Walder, 1995). 
It may be somewhat surprising that we do not find a qualitative difference 
between government interventions and party interventions. Both actors are char-
acterized by clearly differing organizational features and incentive structures, 
which should in theory transform into different performance effects. In contrast to 
the reformed government bureaucracy, firm-level party committees lack sufficient 
insulation from societal claims because it is extensively enmeshed in interest-based 
networks of employees inside the firm. Second, since it lacks both financial interests 
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in firm prosperity (via tax income or residual claims of state shares) and interest 
alignment by performance-based contracts, it does not have the same incentive as 
state bureaucrats to increase a firm's profitability. Instead, the party committee is 
structurally positioned to lobby on behalf of constituents for the redistribution of 
surplus, whether by fighting management's interest in laying off excess workers or 
by providing richer compensation packages for employees. 
Skeptics may point to the fact that our empirical investigation is admittedly 
confined to a relatively small sample of firms. By standard statistical rule, however, 
a 14 percent sample from a population of 483 is more than adequate to make 
inferences about firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Moreover, there is 
no reason to believe that a larger response rate might have reversed our results 
from negative to positive economic effects. This would imply that those firms that 
experience positive economic effects through government involvement systemati-
cally refused to participate in the survey thereby causing a critical non-response 
bias. Such a scenario seems indeed highly unlikely. Why would those firms that 
obviously enjoy beneficial state support in their daily decision-making reject par-
ticipation in a survey conducted by a government institution? The logic should be 
just the reverse. Having good and supportive state-firm relations would - if it has 
any effect - rather increase the firm's willingness to participate. 
The Role of State Involvement in Firms Revisited 
We examined the involvement of state actors - government and party - in the 
corporate governance of firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange to estimate 
their respective economic effect. Extending the underlying logic of Walder's local 
corporatist state approach to the urban decentralized industrial state sector, our 
results do not offer support for the hypothesis predicting entrepreneurial-style 
government behaviour through micro-interventions at firm level. Local state cor-
poratists will of course rightly claim that their approach was designed to explain the 
local state's ability to act as an active entrepreneur promoting TVE development, 
while we extended the idea to the urban sector. This, however, does not weaken 
our argument, as the scope conditions for Walder's causal explanation do not rest 
on spatial prerequisites but distinct organizational features that are met in urban 
and rural areas alike. 
Walder's (1995) local-corporatist state hypothesis hinges on two crucial factors, 
the incentive and also the capability assumption of local bureaucrats, which both 
deserve some closer examination. Kornai's soft-budget constraint theory builds the 
centerpiece of the local corporatist approach (Kornai, 1980, 1990). The claim is 
that fiscal decentralization as experienced in the early 1980s in China hardens local 
governments' budget constraints and thereby provides incentives to act in an 
entrepreneurial way. To begin with, it is worthwhile noting that the concept of soft 
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budget constraints as developed by Kornai (1980, 1990, 1998, 2001) does not refer 
to government but to the firm level. It is the government that creates soft budget 
constraints at the firm level through the extension of preferential loans, tax exemp-
tions and state subsidies. Walder is correct in his conclusion that fiscal federalism 
affects the pervasiveness of soft budget constraints, but not as he assumes in 
hardening budgets at the local government level. Governments themselves have by 
definition 'soft budget constraints' as there is always a bailout guarantee through 
higher level governments, extra-budgetary fees, tax increases and public debt. The 
budget effect of federalist systems rather lies in the fact that fiscal federalism creates 
incentives for interjurisdictional competition that will eventually bring about a 
hardening of budget constraints at the firm level. General macroeconomic models 
reveal the following mechanism: decentralized federalist governments compete 
with each other over mobile capital and labour resources by providing a competi-
tive local infrastructure and business environment (Qian and Roland, 1998). As a 
consequence, opportunity costs of extending political favours in the form of soft 
credits and soft taxation to inefficient firms increase (subsequently causing soft 
budget constraints at the firm level) which thereby reduces incentives for bailouts. 
Eventually, fiscal federalism brings about a hardening of budget constraints at the 
firm level. To this extent, local state corporatists are right to claim that a more 
growth-oriented role for local government is likely to emerge in a federalist system; 
but this is essentially because unproductive bailout strategies of inefficient firms 
become relatively unattractive. 
Walder's interpretation moves beyond this argument in claiming that govern-
ment officials themselves will emerge as active entrepreneurs. There is, however, 
no inherent incentive for government officials, who are essentially acting as 
agents of the local population, to behave as profit-maximizing entrepreneurs. 
Although fiscal federalism can convincingly solve incentive problems at the firm 
level through the hardening of budget constraints, it does not address the indi-
vidual incentives of salaried bureaucrats. If this were the case, hard budgets and 
corporate competition would be sufficient to solve incentive problems inherent in 
any principal agent problem; corporate governance problems stemming from a 
separation between ownership and control could simply not exist (Berle and 
Means, 1932). 
The local state corporatist view of local governments as industrial firms cannot 
resolve the capability constraint of government involvement at the firm level. The 
political economy literature has rightly pointed to the fact that government officials 
are typically serving multiple objectives, which can in the short-run easily impede 
entrepreneurial decision-making (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). Neither fiscal 
federalism nor decentralization of government responsibilities provides an inherent 
argument for why the government's utility function should entirely change. 
Although one might follow the argument that the multiplexity of government goals 
should be less pronounced at the local than at the central government level 
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(Walder, 1995), it is in the very nature of any government to be charged with 
multiple political, economic and social objectives. Potential conflicts of interest are 
illustrated by localist tendencies in China. Conflicts of interest, for instance, emerge 
in the cases of firm extensions across community boundaries, shifts of productions 
sites and the downsizing of firm employment. In each of these cases, the goals to 
maximize local revenues and wage labour naturally collide with a firm's objective 
of profit maximization. Also frequent extension of government help in case of 
labour unrest and local demonstrations, confirms that governments never act 
independently of non-economic goals, so long as they wish to secure broad social 
consensus. 
Finally, the capability of government officials to act as entrepreneurs hinges on 
the solution of the asymmetric information problem between principal and agent. 
None of the recent changes in China's organizational structure could provide a 
solution in this case. Although today's staff-firm relations in public firm adminis-
tration at the local level may be more appropriate than in the traditional system of 
state asset administration, this is of course at best solving capacity constraints. The 
staffing of organizations does not affect capability constraints stemming from 
vertical principal agent relations between government and firm (Hayek, 1945; 
Kornai, 1998). 
We believe the weakness in the local state corporatism hypothesis lies in the 
fact that fiscal federalism and the resulting incentive effects do not substantially 
affect the government's ability to actively intervene in an entrepreneurial way. 
Our findings, however, should not suggest that the Chinese state did not play a 
strong and developmental role facilitating and shaping China's dynamic growth. 
In line with the theory of federalism, we instead suggest that China's success story 
is not built on a helping hand of entrepreneurial government involvement reach-
ing directly into the firm, but suspect that it is the state's ability to create and 
maintain a supportive growth climate (Lin et al., 1996). Based on our extensive 
interviews with entrepreneurs in the Yangzi Delta, conducted over the years 2005 
and 2006, interviewees frequently point to the government's ability to provide a 
pro-growth environment as a decisive development factor. Municipal govern-
ments compete by building supportive business environments to attract and retain 
private capital and facilitate the local entrepreneurs' competitive edge; by devel-
oping reputations for efficient and timely bureaucratic procedures; and through 
indirect incentives that do not interfere with the market mechanism (Yao, 2001). 
They invest in the construction of industrial parks with the infrastructure and 
services that optimize their chances for attracting private investors and entrepre-
neurs. Moreover, the competition is highly transparent, with annual rankings of 
provincial and urban competitiveness providing potential investors with the 
utmost transparency on institutional quality and government efficiency. Direct 
interference, in contrast, is often connected with localist tendencies inhibiting 
a firm's market oriented development and expansion. Close connections with 
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government and party are therefore increasingly regarded as not being particu-
larly helpful. 
In other words, we suspect it is the state bureaucracy's capacity to set up and 
maintain an institutional environment that offers conditions favourable to private 
capital that explains the success of a developmental state in promoting transfor-
mative economic growth. In this sense, China's success is built on the gradual 
liberalization of product and labour markets, increasing openness to foreign trade, 
investment in infrastructure and institutional reforms such as property reforms and 
privatization which provide individual actors with sufficient security for planning, 
investing and economic risk taking. The beneficial effect of the state results from its 
capacity to construct and maintain institutional environments that provide positive 
incentives to entrepreneurs and managers at the firm level to invest in economic 
growth. 
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[1] Vgl. 'Gufenyouxian gongsi guoyou guquan guanli zanxing banfa' (3.11.1994), Art. 33f. in: 
Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Jinrong yu Zhengquan Yanjiusuo (ed.), 2000. 
[2] The first industrial policy guideline was the 'Guowuyuan guanyu dangqian chanye zhengce yaodian de 
jueding,' released by the State Council on March 15, 1989. 
[3] Detailed analysis of the response rates across decision types indicates no obvious pattern. We are 
therefore unable to determine why some respondents left some decisions unrated. However, we 
suspect that this may happen when they have not encountered that decision. This is based on our 
observation that the response rates for the two questions relating to external donation - an 
uncommon activity among listed firms - are the lowest. We therefore do not see any reason to 
believe that any form of self-censorship has led to the provision of incomplete questionnaires. 
Experiments with a larger sample inclusive of firms with incomplete questionnaires confirmed 
our results. 
[4] In the management structure of China's listed firms, the position of BoD secretary is similar to the 
position of managing director; such an individual is expected to be the most knowledgeable about 
a listed firm. 
[5] In addition to data on the involvement of various power holders in listed firms, we obtained data 
on shareholding structure and market prices from the Taiwan Economic Journal. Other data were 
obtained from the Shanghai WIND information Co., Ltd. (WIND). 
[6] As respondents' assessments are inherendy subjective and may be plagued by inconsistency and 
biases, we test the internal consistency of the ratings of 63 decisions for each decision-maker 
including the board of directors, managers, shareholders' meetings and local party committees. 
Results indicate that our data are highly consistent, with Cronbach's alpha exceeding 0.92. We 
also tested the internal consistency of ratings for each type of decisions for each decision-maker. 
Results indicate that they are all consistent, with Cronbach's alpha exceeding 0.78 (the results are 
presented in Appendix III). 
[7] We treat all decisions as equally important and thus assign them equal weightings. However, this 
may not be appropriate because some decisions (e.g., selection of CEO) are more important than 
others (e.g., selection of management consultant). But there is no reliable way to determine the 
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relative importance of different decisions, because appropriate weightings depend on specific firm 
conditions. For example, the choice of a financial consultant may be of central importance for 
firms experiencing financial distress and undergoing strategic restructuring but may be unim-
portant for firms operating under normal conditions. 
[8] Alternative performance measures would actually provide inferior approaches. For instance, 
market valuation, such as the market-to-book value or Tobin's q would presuppose the exist-
ence of an efficient stock market. This assumption is certainly not justified in China's casino-
style stock markets, which are highly distorted by heavy speculation. Particularly, risk 
evaluation is not in line with market-based assessment. Black (1986, p. 533) suggests that 
Tobin's q of about 2 signals the existence of an efficient stock market. In China, Tobin's q 
reached values as high as 3.7 between 1996 and 1999 (Tenev and Zhang, 2002, p. 106). 
Productivity measures actually suffer from data limitations as stock-listed firms do not need to 
reveal the current number of employees. 
[9] The Variance Inflation Factor has been calculated and signals problems due to multicollinear-
ity for R O E and ROA. 
APPENDIX I 
Industrial Structure of Firms, 1999 
All firms listed at Shanghai .Sample firms Respondents with incomplete 
Stock Exchange questionnaires 
Number Number Number 
(percentage) (percentage) (percentage) 
Finance 
Public 
Real estate 
Conglomerate 
Manufacturing 
Wholesale and retail 
Total observations 
3 
(0.64) 
40 
(8.49) 
12 
(2.55) 
81 
(17.20) 
280 
(59.45) 
55 
(11.67) 
471 
0 
(0.00) 
5 
(7.58) 
0 
(0.00) 
16 
(24.24) 
39 
(59.09) 
6 
(9.09) 
66 
1 
(0.55) 
16 
(8.79) 
4 
(2.20) 
22 
(12.09) 
119 
(65.38) 
20 
(10.99) 
182 
Note: China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
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APPENDIX II 
V. Nee et al. 
Fundamental Data of Firms, 1999 
All firms listed at Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Mean 
(SD) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.07 
(0.46) 
0.44 
(0.23) 
19.92 
(1.19) 
0.32 
(0.28) 
471 
Sample firms 
Mean 
(SD) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
0.44 
(0.17) 
19.97 
(1.21) 
0.33 
(0.27) 
66 
Return on assets 
Return on equity 
Debt to asset ratio 
Log of sales 
Percentage of state shares 
Total observations 
Note: China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
APPENDIX III 
Decision-Making Power of Various Power Holders in China's Listed 
Firms 
Shareholders 
mean 
(SD) 
BoD 
mean 
(SD) 
1. Involvement in personnel decisions 
Selection of functional 
department manager 
Performance appraisal of 
functional departments 
Selection of business 
department managers 
Performance appraisal of 
business department 
Selection of branch 
manager 
Performance appraisal of 
branch 
Selection of subsidiary 
manager 
1.35 
(0.59) 
1.39 
(0.64) 
1.34 
(0.61) 
1.32 
(0.58) 
1.42 
(0.65) 
1.39 
(0.64) 
1.49 
(0.83) 
3.03 
(1.21) 
2.72 
(1.16) 
2.61 
(1.18) 
2.55 
(1.13) 
3.07 
(1.28) 
2.94 
(1.28) 
3.41 
(1.20) 
Manager 
mean 
(SD) 
4.31 
(0.71) 
4.32 
(0.77) 
4.34 
(0.74) 
4.31 
(0.80) 
4.18 
(0.87) 
4.18 
(0.83) 
3.92 
(1.03) 
Party 
mean 
(SD) 
2.13 
(1.18) 
1.99 
(1.10) 
2.11 
(1.17) 
1.99 
(1.08) 
2.03 
(1.18) 
1.83 
(1.03) 
2.00 
(1.13) 
Rank of 
party 
power 
1 
6 
2 
7 
3 
15 
4 
Government 
mean 
(SD) 
1.06 
(0.23) 
1.07 
(0.26) 
1.07 
(0.26) 
1.07 
(0.31) 
1.09 
(0.28) 
1.09 
(0.28) 
1.10 
(0.30) 
Rank of 
gov. 
power 
61 
60 
58 
58 
56 
56 
50 
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APPENDIX III (cont.) 
Performance appraisal of 
subsidiaries 
Election and dismissal of 
chairman of BoD 
Performance appraisal of 
and remuneration 
enjoyed by board 
chairman 
Election and dismissal of 
board members 
Performance appraisal of 
and remuneration 
enjoyed by board 
members 
Election and dismissal of 
board secretary 
Performance appraisal of 
and remuneration 
enjoyed by board 
secretary 
Selection of supervisory 
committee members 
Performance appraisal of 
and remuneration of 
supervisory committee 
Selection and dismissal of 
CEO 
Performance appraisal of 
and remuneration 
enjoyed by CEO 
Selection and dismissal of 
vice-CEO 
Performance appraisal of 
and remuneration 
enjoyed by vice-CEO 
M e a n 
Alpha 
Shareholders 
mean 
(SD) 
1.44 
(0.73) 
3.35 
(1.37) 
3.10 
(1.41) 
4.34 
(1.04) 
3.54 
(1.43) 
2.56 
(1.36) 
2.27 
(1.31) 
4.28 
(1.02) 
3.59 
(1.50) 
2.27 
(1.18) 
2.14 
(1.14) 
1.96 
(1.10) 
1.89 
(1.09) 
2.32 
0.92 
BoD 
mean 
(SD) 
3.06 
(1.29) 
4.04 
(1.05) 
3.69 
(1.10) 
3.49 
(0.88) 
3.72 
(0.94) 
4.44 
(0.73) 
4.35 
(0.88) 
2.24 
(1.06) 
2.32 
(1.17) 
4.65 
(0.56) 
4.54 
(0.65) 
4.07 
(1.05) 
4.06 
(1.07) 
3.45 
0.83 
2. Involvement in financial dec i s ions 
Change in shareholding 
structure 
Change in debt/equity 
ratio 
Formulation of dividend 
plan 
4.04 
(1.09) 
3.59 
(1.35) 
4.28 
(1.10) 
3.72 
(0.80) 
3.93 
(0.62) 
3.85 
(0.62) 
Manager 
mean 
(SD) 
4.01 
(0.98) 
1.47 
(0.67) 
1.49 
(0.69) 
1.51 
(0.73) 
1.55 
(0.79) 
1.87 
(0.93) 
2.07 
(1.09) 
1.63 
(0.87) 
1.66 
(0.93) 
1.94 
(1.07) 
2.07 
(1.07) 
3.23 
(1.29) 
3.09 
(1.31) 
2.86 
0.85 
2.27 
(1.13) 
2.58 
(1.09) 
2.37 
(1.02) 
Party 
mean 
(SD) 
1.89 
(1.05) 
1.62 
(0.87) 
1.62 
(0.76) 
1.61 
(0.82) 
1.63 
(0.82) 
1.65 
(0.83) 
1.63 
(0.85) 
1.75 
(0.87) 
1.73 
(0.91) 
1.90 
(1.02) 
1.80 
(0.94) 
2.00 
(1.06) 
1.87 
(1.03) 
1.84 
0.98 
1.39 
(0.67) 
1.37 
(0.59) 
1.34 
(0.58) 
Rank of 
party 
power 
12 
36 
35 
37 
30 
29 
31 
22 
24 
11 
16 
5 
14 
60 
62 
63 
Government 
mean 
(SD) 
1.10 
(0.30) 
1.68 
(1.19) 
1.06 
(0.23) 
1.38 
(0.81) 
1.29 
(0.74) 
1.14 
(0.39) 
1.13 
(0.37) 
1.25 
(0.65) 
1.18 
(0.51) 
1.44 
(0.95) 
1.35 
(0.75) 
1.31 
(0.71) 
1.21 
(0.53) 
1.21 
0.92 
1.56 
(0.98) 
1.43 
(0.85) 
1.18 
(0.59) 
Rank of 
gov. 
power 
50 
1 
61 
15 
24 
43 
45 
28 
35 
8 
17 
19 
31 
4 
10 
35 
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APPENDIX III (com.) 
Shareholders 
Determining share 
placement and new 
issues 
New investment in 
technology 
New investment in 
infrastructure 
Financial investment 
Investment in other stock 
firms 
Sale of assets 
Determining loans for 
fixed asset investment 
Determining loans for 
liquidity fund 
Determining loans 
through mortgaging of 
assets 
Serving as guarantee for 
other firms' large-scale 
loans 
Determining amount of 
external donation 
Determining external 
donation plan 
Contracting of large-scale 
construction Project 
Merging with other firms 
Being merged by other 
firms 
M e a n 
Alpha 
3 . Involvement in strategi 
Organizational change 
Creation and abolition of 
functional Departments 
Creation and abolition of 
business Departments 
Creation and abolition of 
branch 
mean 
(SD) 
4.30 
(1.09) 
3.24 
(1.35) 
3.24 
(1.34) 
3.14 
(1.32) 
3.55 
(1.29) 
3.39 
(1.37) 
2.65 
(1.43) 
2.30 
(1.27) 
3.37 
(1.41) 
3.55 
(1.32) 
2.58 
(1.46) 
2.35 
(1.40) 
2.37 
(1.36) 
4.04 
(1.06) 
4.03 
(1.23) 
3.33 
0.93 
V. Nee et al. 
BoD 
mean 
(SD) 
3.79 
(0.75) 
4.01 
(0.55) 
4.00 
(0.61) 
4.04 
(0.57) 
3.96 
(0.69) 
4.00 
(0.70) 
3.92 
(0.73) 
3.56 
(0.97) 
3.97 
(0.72) 
3.94 
(0.77) 
3.94 
(0.79) 
3.52 
(1.07) 
3.72 
(1.02) 
3.89 
(0.52) 
3.72 
(0.85) 
3.86 
0.87 
c dec i s ions 
2.24 
(1.25) 
1.65 
,0.86) 
1.44 
0.71) 
2.03 
1.22) 
3.92 
(0.84) 
3.66 
(1.08) 
2.93 
(1.26) 
3.68 
(1.03) 
Manager 
mean 
(SD) 
2.49 
(1.05) 
3.27 
(1.04) 
3.17 
(1.01) 
3.04 
(1.03) 
2.94 
(1.12) 
2.90 
(1.10) 
3.42 
(1.05) 
3.68 
(1.08) 
2.99 
(1.04) 
2.85 
(1.06) 
3.04 
(1.22) 
3.20 
(1.20) 
3.42 
(1.08) 
2.94 
(0.97) 
2.73 
(1.07) 
2.96 
0.95 
3.54 
(0.94) 
3.99 
(0.80) 
4.31 
(0.75) 
3.78 
(0.90) 
Party 
mean 
(SD) 
1.37 
(0.62) 
1.44 
(0.73) 
1.44 
(0.73) 
1.39 
(0.67) 
1.42 
(0.71) 
1.47 
(0.84) 
1.44 
(0.75) 
1.39 
(0.73) 
1.47 
(0.81) 
1.44 
(0.75) 
1.69 
(0.95) 
1.76 
(1.01) 
1.54 
(0.79) 
1.55 
(0.84) 
1.62 
(0.96) 
1.47 
0.98 
1.94 
(1.01) 
1.99 
(1.02) 
1.89 
(1.02) 
1.75 
(0.98) 
Rank of 
party 
power 
61 
47 
48 
58 
52 
43 
49 
59 
42 
50 
25 
19 
41 
40 
34 
10 
8 
13 
23 
Government 
mean 
(SD) 
1.56 
(1.01) 
1.49 
(0.93) 
1.53 
(0.95) 
1.38 
(0.83) 
1.31 
(0.73) 
1.43 
(0.85) 
1.40 
(0.82) 
1.29 
(0.74) 
1.32 
(0.78) 
1.26 
(0.65) 
1.31 
(0.76) 
1.31 
(0.76) 
1.31 
(0.66) 
1.60 
(0.94) 
1.68 
(1.03) 
1.417 
0.97 
1.18 
(0.51) 
1.10 
(0.34) 
1.10 
(0.30) 
1.13 
(0.34) 
Rank of 
gov. 
power 
5 
7 
6 
15 
19 
10 
13 
24 
18 
27 
19 
19 
19 
3 
1 
35 
53 
50 
44 
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APPENDIX III (cont. 
Shareholders 
mean 
(SD) 
BoD 
mean 
(SD) 
Manager 
mean 
(SD) 
Party 
mean 
(SD) 
Rank of Government 
party mean 
power (SD) 
Rank of 
gov. 
power 
Creation and abolition of 2.31 3.83 3.54 1.76 20 1.16 40 
subsidiaries (1.37) (0.93) (1.01) (1.01) (0.36) 
Formulation oflong-term 3.49 4.14 3.27 1.66 27 1.42 12 
development plan (1.30) (0.64) (1.00) (0.93) (0.73) 
Formulation of strategic 3.11 4.20 3.30 1.63 32 1.44 8 
plan " (1.41) (0.71) (0.93) (0.93) (0.75) 
Establishment of 2.42 3.78 3.59 1.63 33 1.22 30 
long-term relationship (1.36) (1.02) (0.94) (0.96) (0.48) 
with other firms 
Change of direction, 3.76 3.90 3.27 1.66 28 1.40 13 
entry into new industry (1.21) (0.76) (0.97) (0.99) (0.69) 
and market 
Mean 2.50 3.78 3.62 1.77 1.24 
Alpha 0.82 0.78 0.79 0.96 0.89 
4. Other decisions 
Call of shareholder 3.23 4.07 2.14 1.44 46 1.21 31 
meeting (1.48) (0.78) (0.78) (0.65) (0.41) 
Agenda setting in 3.47 4.03 2.16 1.41 55 1.15 40 
"shareholder meeting (1.37) (0.81) (0.86) (0.60) (0.36) 
Call of board meeting 2.14 4.52 2.32 1.418 57 1.18 35 
(1.07) (0.73) (0.91) (0.60) (0.42) 
Agenda setting in board 2.11 4.49 2.35 1.42 53 1.15 40 
meeting (1.05) (0.84) (0.91) (0.60) (0.40) 
Call of supervisory 1.96 1.89 1.73 1.56 39 1.13 45 
committee meeting (0.99) (0.87) (0.93) (0.71) (0.37) 
Agenda setting in 2.00 1.86 1.73 1.56 38 1.13 45 
supervisory committee (1.03) (0.87) (0.94) (0.73) (0.37) 
meeting 
Call of manager's office 1.63 2.68 4.54 1.79 17 1.17 39 
meeting (0.83) (0.98) (0.67) (0.83) (0.38) 
Agenda setting in 1.59 2.58 4.55 1.79 18 1.19 33 
manager's office (0.75) (0.98) (0.67) (0.83) (0.40) 
meeting 
Selection of 1.42 2.32 4.51 1.66 26 1.08 57 
representatives (0.73) (1.07) (0.83) (0.86) (0.28) 
attending manager's 
office meeting 
Making amendments to 4.11 3.62 2.21 1.45 44 1.29 24 
firm's charter (1.25) (0.74) (0.77) (0.63) (0.74) 
Selection of accounting 3.97 3.82 2.59 1.41 56 1.11 48 
(auditing) firm (1.30) (0.87) (1.15) (0.75) (0.32) 
Selection of law firm 2.97 3.97 2.83 1.42 54 1.11 48 
(1.58) (0.96) (1.24) (0.77) (0.36) 
Selection of financial 2.48 3.92 2.99 1.44 51 1.10 53 
consultant (1.48) (1.04) (1.26) (0.81) (0.34) 
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APPENDIX III (cont.) 
Selection of management 
consultant 
Training and education 
for board Members 
and higher 
management 
Training and education 
for middle 
management 
M e a n of all dec i s ions 
Alpha of all dec i s ions 
Shareholders 
mean 
(SD) 
2.21 
(1.38) 
1.78 
(0.94) 
1.51 
(0.75) 
2.66 
0.97 
V. Nee et al. 
BoD 
mean 
(SD) 
3.93 
(1.06) 
4.17 
(0.94) 
2.94 
(1.32) 
3.61 
0.92 
Manager 
mean 
(SD) 
3.27 
(1.21) 
2.99 
(1.21) 
4.23 
(0.81) 
3.02 
0.97 
Party 
mean 
(SD) 
1.45 
(0.84) 
1.75 
(1.08) 
1.96 
(1.19) 
1.65 
0.99 
Rank of 
party 
power 
45 
21 
9 
Government 
mean 
(SD) 
1.10 
(0.34) 
1.24 
(0.64) 
1.19 
(0.60) 
1.25 
0.98 
Rank of 
gov. 
power 
53 
29 
33 
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